Austrian Alternatives to Neoclassical Consumer Theory
Neoclassical consumer theory makes a number of normally uncontroversial assumptions: that agents can be indifferent between two alternatives; that agents' preferences can be represented with continuous utility functions; and that agents' ignorance and imperfect knowledge can be captured using probability theory. Mises Rothbard tightly ties his argument against indifference to Mises' analysis of the relationship between preference and action. As Mises (1966) argues, "The scale of values manifests itself only in real acting; it can be discerned only from the observation of real acting" (p. 102). Yet it is impossible for action to demonstrate indifference. Action demonstrates preference, not indifference. Rothbard (1962) puts it thusly: "The crucial fallacy is that indifference cannot be a basis for action. If a man were really indifferent between two alternatives, he could not make any choice between them, and therefore the choice could not be revealed in action" (p. 265). It is important to note that Rothbard is not saying that it is difficult to distinguish action based on strict preference from action based on indifference; rather he is saying that every action is necessarily based on strict preference. In other words, "not only are alternatives ranked ordinally on every man's value scale, but they are ranked without ties; i.e., every alternative has a different rank" (Rothbard 1962 , p. 267).
The crucial assumption-shared by both Mises and Rothbard-is that all preferences can be revealed in action. But why assume this? Mises and Rothbard repeatedly disavow behaviorism; introspection yields insight in the social sciences even if it does not in the natural sciences. In his introduction to Mises' Theory and History, Rothbard writes, One example that Mises liked to use in his class to demonstrate the difference between two fundamental ways of approaching human behavior was looking at Grand Central Station behavior during rush hour. The "objective" or "truly scientific" behaviorist, he pointed out, would observe the empirical events: e.g., people 3 Nozick (1997) presents different but complementary arguments against Mises' and Rothbard's utility theory and rejection of indifference analysis. Specifically, (i) Rothbard (1962) implicitly uses indifference analysis when he explains that the units of a good are "interchangeable from the point of view of the actor" and adds that "any concrete pound of butter was evaluated in this case perfectly equally by the individual" (pp. 18-9); (ii) subjective opportunity costs, which play a key role in the analysis of both Mises and Rothbard, are by definition preferences not revealed in action. 4 825 rushing back and forth, aimlessly at certain predictable times of day. And that is all he would know. But the true student of human action would start from the fact that all human behavior is purposive, and he would see the purpose is to get from home to the train to work in the morning, the opposite at night, etc. It is obvious which one would discover and know more about human behavior, and therefore which one would be the genuine "scientist." (Mises 1985, p. xiv) This critique of behaviorism in the social sciences suggests an equally cogent defense of indifference analysis. Just as there is more to my action than my behavior, there is more to my preferences than my action. I have all sorts of preferences that are not-and cannot be-revealed in action. For example, my preference for ice cream at the current instant cannot be revealed since, by the time I managed to find an ice cream vendor, the current instant would have passed. Buying ice cream 10 minutes from now only reveals a preference for ice cream then. And yet, I have introspective knowledge that I want some ice cream right now. Similarly, in a perfectly competitive market, I will never reveal my preference for products at prices other than the market price, but by introspection I can know them.
In precisely the same way, I know that I am sometimes indifferent. I am often indifferent between the colors of clothes; though I pick one color, I know that I would not mind flipping a coin to decide. The behaviorist might deny the reality of my mental states, but clearly that is not the route Mises or Rothbard would want to take. Indeed, McCulloch's (1977) formal treatment of Austrian marginal utility theory argues that behaviorism is a defect of standard consumer theory that the Austrian theory avoids:
The indifferent approach suffers from the positivistic prejudice that science can only take note of "observable" phenomena, and must never attribute human-like motives to its objects of study. The Austrian school, on the other hand, realizes that there is nothing unscientific about attributing human-like motives to human beings. (p. 270) But isn't Mises' and Rothbard's rejection of indifference analysis based on the very prejudice McCulloch attributes to standard consumer theory? One can only observe that I choose a green sweater, but this does not rule out the possibility that I was actually indifferent between the green sweater and the blue sweater. As Oskar Morgenstern (1941) put it in a critique of Hicks, "[I]ntrospection might be experience as much as the observable facts of consumers' choice on the market. Some facts, as the scientist knows, are fully as empirical as others, although their direct observation is not possible .. ." (p. 366). Admittedly, strict preference can sometimes be observationally distinguished from indifference; for example, in a second-price auction with a unique high bid, the high bidder will strictly prefer the object sold to the price paid for it. But this is no reason to ignore the many cases where the observed choice of A over B is equally consistent with strict preference and indifference.
Continuous Utility Functions Versus Discrete Value Scales
The Charge of Cardinality Mises (1966) As if to emphasize the strength of his disagreement with the mainstream approach to utility, Rothbard (1962) goes on to dismiss the familiar intermediate micro theorem7 "that in equilibrium the ratio of the marginal utilities of the various goods equals the ratio of their prices. Without entering in detail into the manner by which these writers arrive at this conclusion, we can see its absurdity clearly, since utilities are not quantities and therefore cannot be divided" (p. 262). What initially appeared to be a slight difference in nomenclature yields disagreement about basic issues.
While the exposition of utility theory in undergraduate textbooks may sometimes be open to Rothbard's critique of cardinality, neoclassical utility theory is no less ordinal than his own theory (see, e.g., Varian 1992, pp. 95-7). Let a neoclassical theorist say "bundle one offers utility of 8, while bundle two offers utility of 7," and Rothbard concludes that he believes in cardinal utility. But the language here is technical; to parse it, you must return to the underlying definitions. The meaning of "bundle one offers utility of 8, while bundle two offers utility of 7" is nothing more or less than "bundle one is preferred to bundle two." A utility function is just a short-hand summary about an agent's ordinal preferences, not a claim about utils. This is why it is often said that the utility function is uniquely defined up to a monotonic transformation. If one utility function represents an agent's preferences, then those preferences can also be represented by any other function that leaves the order unchanged.
The Objection to Continuity
Mises and Rothbard have a second related objection to standard neoclassical utility theory: the assumption of continuity. As Mises (1980a) argues, "[T]he peculiarly mathematical con-6 It should, however, be pointed out that one of Rothbard's earlier essays evinced a more sophisticated understanding of modem utility theory. In particular, he noted the differences between "'measurable up to a multiplicative constant' (cardinal); 'measurable up to a monotonic transform' (ordinal); 'measurable up to a linear transform' (the new quasimeasurement, of which the Neumann-Morgenstern proposed utility index is an example)...." But Rothbard (1956) still ultimately objected that all were confused, for "subjective states, being intensive rather than objectively extensive, cannot be measured and subjected to arithmetic operations. And utility refers to intensive states" (p. 241). 7 Rejecting continuity, however, requires Rothbard to reject more than just utility curves. If continuity assumptions cannot be used because "human beings cannot see the infinitely small step," then it will also be impossible for humans to see not only infinitely small amounts of a good but infinitely small steps of a given monetary unit. But with a discrete good and a discrete monetary unit, it is unlikely that supply and demand will ever be equal; no equilibrium price need exist.8 Excess demand may be -2 units when the price is $1.01 and +1 unit when the price is $1.00. Thus, the argument against calculus based upon the rejection of continuity also argues against the use of simple algebraic constructs, like intersecting supply and demand lines, that fill Rothbard's works.
Rothbard runs into a contradiction. If the assumption of continuity is not a harmless fiction, then it is incumbent upon him to remove all of the supply and demand intersections in his works and to state that supply equals demand only under extremely rare conditions.9 Alternately, Rothbard could concede that assuming continuity rarely alters substantive results and accept both supply and demand intersections and the use of calculus as methodologically acceptable in economics.
The Income and Substitution Effects
Though Rothbard rejects neoclassical utility theory, he makes ad hoc concessions to it elsewhere in his writings. Using his value scale approach, Rothbard (1962) claims to derive the laws of demand and supply as exceptionless theorems. When he says "demand must either increase or remain the same as the price decreases" and "supply must always remain unchanged or increase with an increase in price," he literally means "must" (pp. 106-7; emphasis mine). But in his later discussion of labor and land, Rothbard concedes the theoretical possibility of backward bending supply curves (pp. 515-6). Furthermore, in his treatment of the economics of taxation, Rothbard admits the theoretical possibility that greater taxation of labor income could induce an increase in labor supplied, going so far as to mention a substitution and an income effect, which his initial treatment of utility theory and demand fails to mention and indeed directly contradicts (p. 797). What is interesting is that Rothbard is unable to derive the substitution and income effects from his value scale approach. While he dismisses the neoclassical approach to utility theory, Rothbard deems it sufficiently fruitful that he borrows its implications on an ad hoc basis.10 In short, this is a bona fide case where neoclassical economists did not merely tediously formalize the obvious but actually gained new and intuitive insight by consistently applying their standard approach.
Uncertainty and Probability
Economic agents have to make decisions in a world of uncertainty; but what exactly does uncertain mean?l In neoclassical analysis, it simply means that there exists a known probability distribution (objective or subjective) with more than one possible outcome (Varian 1992, pp.
172-97).
Choice in the real world of uncertainty is no different from playing a game with known rules and multiple possible outcomes. Mises and Rothbard, however, insist that most economic uncertainty simply defies quantification; there is usually no known probability distribution for agents to use.12 Mises (1966) distinguishes between class probability and case probability:'3 Class probability means: We know or assume to know, with regard to the problem concerned, everything about the behavior of a whole class of events or phenomena; but about the actual singular events or phenomena we know nothing but that they are elements in this class. (p. 107) Case probability means: We know, with regard to a particular event, some of the factors which determine its outcome; but there are other determining factors about which we know nothing. (p. 110)
Mises insists that only class probability can be meaningfully quantified, whereas the quantification of case probability is at best metaphorical. One can make meaningful quantitative statements about the probability that someone will win a lottery since we can find out the behavior of the whole class of lottery tickets. But it is meaningless to quantify the probability that Al Gore will win the 2000 presidential election. The latter is, in Mises' (1966) words, "an individual, unique, and nonrepeatable case" (p. 111). Since there is only one such election, it 10 McCulloch (1977) provides a more sophisticated and formal presentation of Austrian utility theory but still does not derive the income and substitution effects, although he also does not show that such a derivation is impossible. See, for example, Weatherford (1982) for a survey of the main interpretations of probability theory; for a recent defense of Bayesian reasoning in the sciences and in general, see Howson and Urbach (1989) . 12 Rothbard (1979) is particularly emphatic about how rarely uncertainty can be legitimately quantified: "In the real world of human action, virtually all historical events are unique and heterogeneous.... Since each event is unique and nonreproducible, it is impermissible to apply objective probability theory; expectations and forecasting become a matter of subjective estimates of future events, estimates that cannot be reduced to an objective or 'scientific' formula. It is no accident that social scientists arguing for the use of the objective probability calculus almost invariably cite the case of the lottery; for a lottery is one of the few human situations where the outcomes are indeed homogeneous and reproducible .. ." (pp. 93-4). Note that, as the rest of the section shows, Rothbard, like Mises, claims that only objective probabilities (class probabilities) admit of quantification. 13 Mises' class probability appears to be the same as objective probability, but case probability does not readily translate to subjective probability. In particular, subjective probabilities can be quantified, but Mises' case probabilities cannot be (see Langlois [1994] for an attempt to translate Mises' terminology into more familiar categories (Knight 1985) . One can insure against risk; the class probability of fire hazards, accidental death, and so on can be readily quantified. But it is not possible to insure against the true uncertainty of unique events because these are instances of unquantifiable case probability. While Mises and Rothbard acknowledge that quantifiable class probability plays some role in economic life, they insist that economic actors usually have nothing better than case probability to work with. Entrepreneurs in particular have to make choices without a known probability distribution; as Rothbard (1962) argues, "Estimates of future costs, demands, etc., on the part of entrepreneurs are all unique cases of uncertainty, where methods of specific understanding and individual judgment of the situation must apply, rather than objectively measurable or insurable 'risk' " (p. 500).
Mises (1966) is convinced that his analyis of probability is "the only logically satisfactory one" (p. 109). He overlooks some serious difficulties.'4 Most fundamentally, every event is unique; if quantitative probability does not apply to unique events, then quantitative probability never applies to actual, specific situations (Weatherford 1982, pp. 161-7, 227-33). Even in games of chance, all draws and throws are "individual, unique, and nonrepeatable." Dice are always rolled at a particular time and place, in casinos of varying honesty, so we never "know nothing but that they are elements" of the class of dice. Additional information inevitably accompanies every real case. Unless the probability of some unique events can be quantified, Mises seems forced to deny that probability can ever be quantified.
One 16 One referee argues that Kirznerian sheer ignorance is unquantified rather than unquantifiable uncertainty: "Sheer ignorance doesn't mean that I can't meaningfully assign a quantitative probability to event x; it means that I have disregarded the possibility of event x.... It didn't make [my] list of events to which probabilities were assigned." Still, Kirzner seems to hold that it is virtually impossible for anyone to ever have a complete list of events to which probabilities may be assigned. At least empirically, if not logically, unquantifiable uncertainty is always with us, which precludes, for example, the calculation of the expected value of overlooked profit opportunities. It is also worth mentioning that the distinction between failing to assign an event a probability and assigning it a zero probability is tenuous; what is the difference between failing to pay me and paying me zero dollars? search literature, therefore, search is correctly treated as any other deliberate process of production. But it is in the nature of an overlooked profit opportunity that it has been utterly overlooked, i.e., that one is not aware at all that one has missed the grasping of any profit" (p. 71). Thomsen (1992) is particularly ecumenical, but shares Kirzner's concern that there is sometimes more to uncertainty than known probability distributions:
[T]he fertility of approaches such as that of the economics of information and of search theory may lead some economists into believing that all problems of knowledge in an economy are being studied. It will be argued that these approaches, because they treat knowledge as just another scarce good, do not fully encompass the knowledge problem faced in reality and in fact underestimate it. If they were to mislead economists into overlooking a more radical type of ignorance, they would have obstructed a fuller comprehension of prices and markets. (p. 5)
But why should economists believe that any more radical type of ignorance exists? For Kirzner (1997), sheer ignorance explains why discoverers experience surprise: "What distinguishes discovery ... from successful search ... is that the former (unlike the latter) involves that surprise which accompanies the realization that one had overlooked something in fact readily available. ('It was right under my very nose!')" (p. 72). Yet there is a simpler explanation consistent with standard probability theory: Improbable outcomes are inherently surprising. When you win a massive jackpot at a slot machine, you are likely to feel surprised precisely because the odds were loudly advertised as "one-in-a-million."'7
Kirzner (1997) also insists that sheer ignorance is necessary to explain entrepreneurship: "In standard neoclassical equilibrium theory there is, by its very character, no role for the entrepreneur. In equilibrium there is no scope for pure profit: there is simply nothing for the entrepreneur to do" (p. 69). To the contrary, entrepreneurship can be seen as equilibrium search conducted by people with a comparative advantage in spotting investment opportunities. Expectationally, they earn no pure profits but rather receive a standard return on their search abilities. What look like enormous entrepreneurial profits are due to exceptional ex ante search abilities and/or luck. There is no need to make exceptions to the universal applicability of probability theory in order to explain Henry Ford or Bill Gates.
Kirzner (1979) himself concedes the possibility of this route: "[O]ne might insist that an
agent not blessed with the alertness needed to notice resources available at hand, simply lacks, through no 'fault' of his own, another 'resource' (i.e., 'alertness') necessary to take advantage of the resources with which he has been blessed. We cannot set down such a use of terms as
wrong" (p. 130). But if there is a standard neoclassical way to view alertness, why should Kirzner's alternative be accepted? The quote continues:
We simply point out that while decisions can in principle be made by a person lacking any needed resources, including "knowledge," to acquire that resource he lacks, we cannot conceive of one who lacks alertness making a decision to acquire it. This is so because, among other reasons, before a decision to acquire anything can be considered, one must already assume the alertness necessary for the perception that such an acquisition is needed and possible at all. (pp. 130-1)
Again, this argument is overstated. True, it would be impossible for a completely unaware person to decide to acquire some alertness. But this would not preclude a person with some degree of alertness deciding to try to acquire more. In short, the initial endowment of human capital of almost all people includes some degree of alertness, which is combined with other resources to produce greater alertness, and so on.
Neoclassical theory treats all uncertainty as quantifiable. Mises, Rothbard, and more recent Austrian writers argue that this is a prime example of the unrealism and implausibility of neoclassical assumptions. But the neoclassical view looks commonsensical when compared to the Austrian view that some uncertainty simply defies quantification. As Weatherford (1982) puts it in a slightly different context, "[C]ould anyone convince a working astronomer that ... there might be no probability that a star is a red giant? What would it mean to say that there is no probability that a star is a red giant when we know that many are red giants?" (p. 204). Action absent any knowledge of the probabilities of different events is hard to conceive. If you could either have $10 with certainty or $100 with an unquantifiable probability, it is unclear how you would decide. Mises, Rothbard, and Kirzner all require actors to weigh incommensurables, to somehow trade off known probabilities against the unquantifiable. As de Finetti (1980) forcefully puts it, "The [Bayesian] notion of probability which we have described is without doubt the closest to that of 'the man in the street'; better yet, it is that which he applies every day in practical judgments. Why should science repudiate it?"'8 (p. 71). While this conclusion appears to be a simplistic non sequitur, it follows immediately from his unusual utility theory. For Mises or Rothbard, it is simply confused to posit latent preferences; if two individuals fail to make an exchange, then this ipso facto demonstrates that at that moment at least one of them would not have benefited from the exchange. Similarly, Rothbard (1977) rejects the argument that an externality, such as the envy of a third party, vitiates the principle that voluntary exchange increases social utility:
Reconstructing Welfare Economics
We cannot, however, deal with hypothetical utilities divorced from concrete action. We may, as praxeologists, deal only with utilities that we can deduce from the concrete behavior of human beings. A person's 'envy,' unembodied in action, becomes pure moonshine from a praxeological point of view.... How he feels about the exchanges made by others cannot be demonstrated unless he commits an invasive act. Even if he publishes a pamphlet denouncing these exchanges, we have no ironclad proof that this is not a joke or a deliberate lie. (p. 18) Indeed, Rothbard could have taken this principle further. When two people sign a contract, do they actually demonstrate their preference for the terms of the contract? Perhaps they merely demonstrate their preference for writing their name on the piece of paper in front of them. There is no ironclad proof that putting one's name on a piece of paper is not a joke or an effort to improve one's penmanship.
Rothbard's view is stronger than the truism that, taking transactions costs into account, every state of affairs is necessarily Pareto optimal (Demsetz 1988, pp. 63-4). While he would agree with this truism, Rothbard also holds-as orthodox neoclassicals would not-that every voluntary exchange is necessarily a Pareto improvement since external effects arguments constitute illegitimate appeals to latent preferences. It is important to note, however, that Rothbard does not claim that government intervention reduces social utility.20 Since the victim loses and the intervener gains from the application of coercion, it would be impossible to assert this without making a verboten interpersonal welfare comparison. Rothbard could only claim the welfare effect of government intervention upon social utility is indeterminate. This is an important point because it shows that Rothbard's welfare economics provides a much weaker defense of laissez-faire than usually assumed. In particular, Rothbard's own theory strips him of the ability to call any act of government inefficient. By denying others the ability to endorse state action in the name of efficiency, Rothbard also implicitly denies his own ability to reject state action in the name of efficiency. His welfare criterion justifies agnosticism about-not denial of-the benefits of state action (Prychitko 1993 ).
Rothbard's refusal to acknowledge unobserved preferences would have to impress even B. are not the same, this criterion of efficiency has many advantages over Rothbard's approach. In particular, it actually allows one to make efficiency judgments about the real world-to judge, for example, that Communism was inefficient or rent control is inefficient or piracy was inefficient. Determining the normative import of efficiency can then, as Rothbard suggests, be delegated to ethicists.
Public Goods
At times, Mises seems to have a standard neoclassical analysis of the public goods problem, albeit one that puts the blame on poorly defined property rights rather than the free market as such: Thus, while Mises' analysis initially sounds neoclassical, his discussion of positive externalities appears to make the strong claim that the free market ipso facto serves the most urgent needs of the consumers.
Rothbard's (1962) critique of neoclassical public goods theory is quite similar to Mises', but Rothbard derives his objections from his novel utility theory, making the critique clearer and more general:
As for the recipients, they are being forced by the State to pay for benefits that they otherwise would not have purchased. How can we say that they "benefit"? A standard reply is that the recipients "could not" have obtained the benefit even if they wanted to buy it voluntarily. The first problem here is by what mysterious process the critics know that the recipients would have liked to purchase the "benefit." Our only way of knowing the content of preference scales is to see them revealed in concrete choices. Since the choice concretely was not to buy the benefit, there is no justification for outsiders to assert that B's preference scale 
Conclusion
The Austrian challenge to the realism of neoclassical assumptions actually helps make those assumptions more plausible. Setting aside arguments about predictive ability (Friedman 1953) , neoclassical economic theory often looks realistic next to various Austrian challenges. Standard consumer theory affirms that preferences exist regardless of whether they are revealed in action and that people are sometimes indifferent when they act. Rebuilding consumer theory on the contrary view makes the Mises-Rothbard approach less, not more, realistic. Neoclassical theory treats all ignorance as quantifiable in terms of probability theory. Even if this sounds implausible at first, it makes a lot of sense compared to the various Austrian versions of literally unquantifiable uncertainty. In particular, the more carefully Kirzner spells out the implications of radical ignorance the stranger and less realistic they grow. Consider, for example, Kirzner's (1973) claim that "no monopoly over entrepreneurship is imaginable (since no resources are required for pure entrepreneurship) .. ." (p. 103). Yet it is difficult to see how anything can be accomplished with zero resources. Isn't there an opportunity cost of mental effort?
The same holds for the Austrian alternatives to neoclassical welfare economics. Common sense balks when Rothbard rules out any discussion of public goods on the grounds that it impermissibly discusses preferences not revealed in action. It is similarly implausible for Kirzner to appeal to radical ignorance to avoid Panglossian paralysis. Taking transactions costs into account, Kirzner (1988) 
